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Removal and Violation of Status – Avvo.com http://ping.fm/GKIEv

Removal and Alien Smuggling – Avvo.com http://ping.fm/juOup

Removal Proceedings and the Notice to Appear – Avvo.com http://ping.fm/eWunI

Removal and Marriage Fruad – Avvo.com http://ping.fm/4zol1

Deportation and Removal Proceedings on Removability – Avvo.com http://ping.fm/WPLgt

An alien is not independently “grandfathered” for purposes of adjustment of status under section 245(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1255(i) (2006), simply by virtue of marriage to another alien who is “grandfathered” under section 245(i) as the result of having been a derivative beneficiary of a visa petition.

Where petitioners sought review of a Board of Immigration Appeals decision denying their motion to reopen their removal proceedings, and some of the evidence they submitted was cumulative of evidence they had submitted during their hearing, while some was not, Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision to the extent that it pertained to the noncumulative evidence, but lacked jurisdiction to review the decision as it pertained to the cumulative evidence, except to the extent that the petitioners raised a question of law regarding the treatment of that evidence. BIA did not abuse its discretion in concluding that petitioners’ daughter’s new medical condition, which allegedly required reconstructive surgery for a disfigurement on her external ear, did not warrant reopening, but BIA erred where it failed to exercise its discretion to consider or decline to consider petitioners’ supplemental brief and an attached exhibit relating to a new, allegedly precancerous medical condition allegedly incurred by one petitioner’s mother.

Where petitioner commenced formal removal proceedings and applied for cancellation of removal–but left the country and then tried to reenter, leading to his removal under an expedited removal order–the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to review an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals dismissing his appeal of an immigration judge’s decision terminating his formal removal proceedings because the decisions of the BIA and the immigration judge resulted in no final order of removal.

Petitioner’s conviction for assault with a deadly weapon under Nevada state law was categorically a crime of violence, rendering him ineligible for cancellation of removal, because it necessarily entailed the threatened use of force against the person of another, which involved a substantial risk of force.

Where different debtors filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy at a time when the value of the equity in their homes was less than the amount they were eligible to claim, respectively, under the federal or Arizona homestead exemptions, leaving no value in the homestead properties that could be claimed by the bankruptcy estate, but the value of the properties subsequently increased before the cases were closed so that the debtors had equity in excess of their exemptions, the trustee could force a sale of the properties in order to recover the excess equity because the exemptions allowed the debtors to claim an interest in dollar amounts, not specific properties. The fact that the value of the claimed exemption plus encumbrances equaled market value at the time of filing did not remove the entire asset from the estate. Assuming estoppel is available as a remedy in bankruptcy proceedings, debtor could not estop trustee from selling debtor’s home where debtor made no showing that the trustee–who left the case open for years–intended for the debtor to act as if he would be able to retain the property permanently; that the debtor had a right to believe the trustee, by her inaction, intended the debtor to believe she had released all rights to the homestead; or that the debtor was ignorant of the true facts. Any duty to police misconduct by the trustee fell upon the U.S. Trustee in debtor’s district, and abandonment of an asset is not a remedy for a trustee’s alleged misconduct.