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How to Apply for Asylum?

To be eligible for asylum in the United States, you must ask for asylum at a port-of-entry (airport, seaport or border crossing), or file an application within one year of your arrival in the United States. You may ask later than one year if conditions in your country have changed or if your personal circumstances have changed within the past year prior to your asking for asylum, and those changes of circumstances affected your eligibility for asylum. You may also be excused from the one year deadline if extraordinary circumstance prevented you from filing within the one year period after your arrival, so long as you apply within a reasonable time given those circumstances. You may apply for asylum regardless of your immigration status, meaning that you may apply even if you are illegally in the United States.

In addition, you must qualify for asylum under the definition of “refugee.” Your eligibility will be based on information you provide on your application and during an interview with an Asylum Officer or Immigration Judge. If you have been placed in removal (deportation) proceedings in Immigration Court, an Immigration Judge will hear and decide your case. If you have not been placed in removal proceedings and apply with the BCIS , an Asylum Officer will interview you and decide whether you are eligible for asylum. Asylum Officers will grant asylum, deny asylum or refer the case to an Immigration Judge for a final decision. If an Asylum Officer finds that you are not eligible for asylum and you are in the United States illegally, the Asylum Officer will place you in removal proceedings and refer your application to an Immigration Judge for a final decision. Immigration Judges also decide on removal if an applicant is found ineligible for asylum and is illegally in the United States. If you are in valid immigrant or nonimmigrant status and the Asylum Officer finds that you are not eligible for asylum, the Asylum Officer will send you a notice explaining that the BCIS intends to deny your request for asylum. You will be given an opportunity to respond to that notice before a decision is made on your application.

Adjudication of asylum

Appeal asylum

Asylum seekers

Immigrant children and asylum

 

 

 

 

 

What is the United States Asylum Program and Who Benefits?

Asylum may be granted to people who are already in the United States and are unable or unwilling to return to their home country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. If you are granted asylum, you will be allowed to live and work in the United States. You also will be able to apply for permanent resident status one year after you are granted asylum.

You may include your spouse and any unmarried children under the age of 21 in your own asylum application if your spouse or children are in the United States.

Asylum status and refugee status are closely related. They differ only in the place where a person asks for the status asylum is asked for in the United States; refugee status is asked for outside of the United States. However, all people who are granted asylum must meet the definition of a refugee. If you will apply outside the United States, please see How Do I Get Resettled in the United States as a Refugee?. If you do not qualify for asylum, but fear being tortured upon returning to your homeland, you can apply for consideration under the Torture Convention.

Asylum

Asylum agreements

Asylum applicants

Get a California deportation attorney to help you file asylum

Filing an Asylum Application

(1) An alien does not receive an automatic 1-year extension in which to

file an asylum application following “changed circumstances” under
section 208(a)(2)(D) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §
1158(a)(2)(D) (2006).
(2) Under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(4)(ii) (2010), the particular circumstances
related to delays in filing an asylum application must be evaluated to determine
whether the application was filed “within a reasonable period given those
‘changed circumstances.’”

Adjudication of asylum

Asylum meaning

Asylum agreements

Get a California deportation Attorney to help you file asylum

Recent win for the Law Offices of Brian D. Lerner, APC

Asylum granted for client who is a homosexual African male from Kenya. Client was physically attacked and threatened several times because of his sexual orientation. No medical documents but a very strong declaration from Client and other country materials showing that gays and lesbians are persecuted in Kenya.

https://cbocalbos.wordpress.com/2015/11/03/immigration-getting-hit-because-bad-treatment-upon-woman-and-children/

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https://cbocalbos.wordpress.com/2009/12/31/recent-win-for-the-law-offices-of-brian-d-lerner-apc/

Being exiled from the U.S.

Question: Many people from around the world are being persecuted, tortured, imprisoned or killed in their home countries. However, sometimes they do not win. I heard that they may not be allowed to ever get immigration benefits again. Is this true?

Answer: They flee this persecution and apply for asylum in the United States. As a side benefit of applying for asylum, people can get work-permits which sometimes are more important for these people than the actual asylum. In the past, applying for asylum would be abused by thousands of people for this very purpose.

Thus, in 1996, Congress enacted a law which essentially stated that if someone files a frivolous asylum application, they would be permanently barred from ever applying for any immigration benefit for the rest of their lives. This bar would apply if the Immigration Judge made a ruling that the asylum application was frivolous or meritless.

In a recent 9th Circuit decision, Jamal vs. Ashcroft, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 23239 (9th Cir. 2003), the alien first challenged the Immigration Judge’s credibility determination underlying his removal order. The Immigration Judge had made a specific ruling that the alien was not credible. The Immigration Judge identified specific inconsistencies in the alien’s testimony, his expert’s testimony, his brother’s testimony, and between the different witnesses’ testimony. Further, the Immigration Judge ruled that the inconsistencies went to the heart of the asylum application and the alien’s identity, his membership in a persecuted group, and the date he entered the United States.

The Immigration Judge then ruled that the alien knowingly filed a frivolous asylum application and ordered that the alien be removed from the United States. Thus, because of this ruling the alien was barred for life from ever coming back to the United States. The alien appealed both the removal order and the order that the asylum application was frivolous.

Such a finding carries the severe penalty of a permanent bar to immigration relief. Immigration regulations require there to be sufficient opportunity to account for discrepancies or implausibilities.

The Immigration Judge reviewed with Farah the consequences of filing a frivolous asylum application. However, Farah wanted to continue with the application. In the end, the Immigration Judge found that Farah had knowingly filed a frivolous asylum application, but never allowed Farah to explain any of the inconsistencies the Immigration Judge relied upon in making that decision.

The primary issue to be answered is whether the Immigration Judge ruled correctly on whether there was a knowingly frivolous asylum application filed. This issue is of critical importance as it bears on whether persons who might have a colorable asylum claim will step forward and apply. If they feel that they will be adjudged to have filed a knowingly frivolous asylum application, a chilling effect for asylum seekers will occur. They will be afraid to file these applications. Instead of the United States attempting to adjudicate an asylum claims, the United States will be sending out a message to try to exclude valid claims.

The Immigration Judge concluded that Farah’s asylum application was so inconsistent that it rose to the level of being knowingly frivolous under the immigration laws.

In this case, the Immigration Judge found two specific examples of fabrication that were relevant to his decision: the petitioner’s entry date and his travel history. In his decision, the IJ held that it was clear that the respondent did not enter in New York on January 24, 1999, in the manner in which he stated and that he has fabricated that portion of his claim. The Immigration Judge further stated that he has also been untruthful as to whether he was in Nairobi, Kakuma, London, England or any other place before he came to the United States.

This court stated that Farah had ample opportunities to explain the discrepancies that led to the adverse credibility finding. For example, discrepancies in his father’s name and in his clan identity. To support the finding of frivolousness, however, the Immigration Judge relied with particularity on different discrepancies between what Farah said and the extrinsic evidence. Farah was not given an adequate opportunity to address those additional discrepancies before the ruling on frivolousness was made. In sum, the evidence presented did not allow a proper opportunity for Farah to explain all discrepancies in the record. Therefore, the court overturned the decision of the Immigration Judge that the application was knowingly frivolous.

Even though the Court did not reverse the decision denying the asylum, they did reverse the permanent bar to future filings with immigration. Now, aliens with colorable asylum claims will not be afraid to present those claims to the United States.

What does the REAL ID Act mean?

Question: I have heard so much about the REAL ID Act, but do not really understand what it is. Can you explain?

Answer: The REAL ID Act made two changes to INA § 242(a)(2)(B), an INA subsection added by IIRIRA that precludes federal court jurisdiction over certain discretionary decisions. One of these changes purports to expand § 242(a)(2)(B) to non-removal cases.

Courts have only recently begun to interpret the REAL ID Act.

Question: What is INA § 242(a)(2)(B)?

Answer: INA § 242(a)(2)(B), entitled “Denials of Discretionary Relief,” restricts when federal courts have jurisdiction over certain types of discretionary decisions and action by the government in immigration cases.

INA § 242(a)(2)(B) includes two subparts. The first limits federal court jurisdiction over a “judgment regarding the granting of relief under section criminal and fraud waivers, cancellation of removal or adjustment proceedings. The second subpart restricts federal court jurisdiction over “any other decision or action … the authority for which is specified under this title [Title II] to be in the discretion or the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security.” Asylum decisions are specifically exempted from this bar on jurisdiction.

For § 242(a)(2)(B) to apply, a case must fall within one of these two subsections. Each subpart has been interpreted narrowly, in accord with the specific language chosen by Congress.

The REAL ID Act also expanded the scope of § 242(a)(2)(B) so that it now applies “regardless of whether the [discretionary] judgment, decision, or action is made in removal proceedings.” Prior to the REAL ID Act, some – though not all courts had held that § 242(a)(2)(B) was applicable only in removal cases. Presumably, this amendment was intended to reverse these earlier court decisions.

Question: Do these amendments eliminate all mandamus and other types of affirmative suits in non-removal cases?

Answer: No, these changes do not eliminate all jurisdictions over mandamus and other affirmative lawsuits in non-removal cases. To determine whether jurisdiction remains available in a particular case, a practitioner may carry out a several step analysis. This analysis is essentially the same as the analysis to determine whether jurisdiction exists in a removal case involving agency discretion. Consequently, court decisions interpreting § 242(a)(2)(B) in the removal context will be helpful in determining whether the provision applies in a non-removal case.

Question: What steps are involved in determining whether a court has jurisdiction under § 242(a)(2)(B) in a removal or non-removal case?

Answer: While there are several issues in such an analysis, the first issue will be looked at in this article. INA § 242(a)(2)(B) does not apply to every immigration-related case. Thus, the first step is to determine if the case is entirely outside the reach of § 242(a)(2)(B). There are at least four general categories of cases that arguably fall outside the reach of this section.

A. INA § 242(a)(2)(B) only limits jurisdiction over certain discretionary actions and decisions. Neither this section nor the REAL ID Act stripped federal courts of jurisdiction where the government has a nondiscretionary duty to act. In mandamus cases in particular, the existence of a mandatory, non-discretionary duty on the part of the government is an essential element of the claim. Thus, mandamus actions by definition generally should not fall within the restrictions of INA § 242(a)(2)(B).

B. INA § 242(a)(2)(B) does not apply to asylum decisions. Asylum is not one of the forms of discretionary relief specifically mentioned in § 242(a)(2)(B)(i), and thus this subsection does not apply to asylum cases. Additionally, asylum is specifically exempted from § 242(a)(2)(B)(ii), and thus this subsection also does not apply to asylum cases. Consequently, § 242(a)(2)(B) should never be an issue with respect to federal court jurisdiction over asylum cases, even if the challenged agency action is a discretionary one.

C. INA § 242(a)(2)(B) also does not apply to naturalization decisions. Additionally, § 242(a)(2)(B)(ii) states that it applies to agency decisions or action, “the authority for which is specified under this title” to be discretionary. Consequently, INA § 242(a)(2)(B) should never be an issue in federal court jurisdiction over a naturalization decision, even one involving discretion.

D. INA § 242(a)(2) should not apply to S, T and U visas. While generally, this provision contains definitions that do not authorize discretion, there are a few exceptions. For example, the definition of the non-immigrant “T” visa category includes as an eligibility requirement that the Attorney General determine if the individual “would suffer extreme hardship involving unusual and severe harm upon removal.” The determination of extreme hardship has been held to be a discretionary determination. Arguably, however, the exercise of the Attorney General’s discretion with respect to a T visa would not fall within the bar to jurisdiction in § 242(a)(2)(B)(ii) because the statutory authority for this discretion is found in Title I, not Title II. The definitions of the “S” and “U” visa categories contain similar grants of discretion that fall outside the scope of § 242(a)(2)(B).

Thus, the REAL ID Act did not completely eliminate federal court jurisdiction.

Does the Government need to know you will be tortured?

 Question: I have heard a great deal about the Convention Against Torture and what might be needed. I have a friend that escaped his country because he thought he was going to be killed. However, I am not sure if the government knew that this group of rebels wanted to torture him. Will this qualify for the Convention Against Torture?

Answer: There is a case that just came down in the 9th Circuit Courts of Appeal and it address this issue. First, it is necessary to discuss the facts of that case. In Colombia, Ochoa owned a women’s clothing store in the San Andresito Shopping Center. Initially, Ochoa purchased clothes in Colombia and sold them at his shop. Then in 1996, he started traveling to the United States to purchase clothing. The clothes he purchased were shipped to Colombia, where he sold them wholesale and retail. In the course of Ochoa’s business he borrowed $20,000 from a private lender. The money was lent to Ochoa at six percent interest monthly, seventy-two percent interest annually. In addition to lending money, the lender sent retailers to Ochoa. The retailers would buy clothing from Ochoa on credit and then resell the clothes. The retailers would post-date OCHOA v. GONZALES 5235 checks for the clothes and thirty days later Ochoa would cash the checks. Several of the retailers defaulted on their checks. Ochoa never recovered the money. Because the retailers defaulted on their credit, Ochoa could not repay his loan. Soon thereafter a man named Efrain came to Ochoa’s store on behalf of the lender to collect the money. In a very harsh way, Efrain demanded Ochoa repay the money immediately. Ochoa had heard that Efrain was the “kind of person that you had to watch out for, that he had possibly killed one or two people, but that no one could really prove it.” Ochoa was also approached by a person who claimed to own the money lent to Ochoa. This person, who never said his name, proposed a plan for Ochoa to work for him to repay the loan. Ochoa testified, “he simply wanted me to keep on doing my traveling, so they’d be in charge of picking up my merchandise, send it to Colombia, and then delivering it to me.” Ochoa’s testimony and evidence in the record indicates the lender was a narco trafficker and that he was pressuring Ochoa to participate in a narco-trafficking money laundering scheme. Ochoa did not accept the proposal. Instead, Ochoa offered to give the lender/narco-trafficker his house, car, and business to pay off the loan. The approximate value of these things was $30,000. This would have been an immediate fifty percent profit on the loan. The lender refused. Ochoa’s friends and family advised him to reject the deal and “to just get out, to leave.” They said that people who “worked” for the lenders “normally got killed, or else those who refused to work for them got killed right away.” Ochoa said in his asylum declaration that “In San Andrecito merchants disappeared on a regular basis without any police inquiry, when the merchants had fallen in disgrace with the money lenders.” Because of the threats to their lives Ochoa and Diaz left Colombia and came to the United States. Ochoa entered the United States on December 4, 1997. Diaz entered approximately a month and a half later. They have not returned to 5236 OCHOA v. GONZALES Colombia since. Ochoa believes the situation in Colombia has “actually gotten worse” since they left.

Question: What happened at the Immigration Court with these people?

Answer: The Judge found the petitioners credible and directed Colombia as the country of removal. The Judge denied the petitioners’ applications for asylum and withholding because he found the petitioners did not prove their fear of persecution was “on account of” an enumerated basis. The Judge found the petitioners would be subject to torture if they returned to Colombia and he granted them withholding under the Convention Against Torture (CAT.) The Board of Immigration Appeals reversed the Judges decision that granted relief under CAT. The BIA found there was not sufficient evidence to show the government’s acquiescence in the feared torture.

Question: This certainly seems unfair. What was the outcome in the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals?

Answer: Under CAT a person qualifies for relief if “it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured in their home country. CAT define torture as “any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for . . . any reason based on discrimination of any kind . . . by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.” The BIA found Ochoa could not show the Colombian government acquiesced to the feared torture. That standard (which is now overruled) requires a petitioner to “do more than show that the officials are aware of the activity constituting torture but are powerless to stop it.” In that standard, it is required that government officials to be “willfully accepting” of the feared torturous activities.

The proper standard under CAT is that a petitioner need only prove the government is aware of a third party’s tortuous activity and does nothing to intervene to prevent it. Therefore, in your friend’s case, if he can show the government is aware of the rebel activity, but does nothing to stop it, he will have met that standard for CATS.

PERM: More on Terrorism.

Question: I have heard a great deal of new regulations and rules regarding anti-terrorism efforts. Have there been any new provisions recently that have been added?

Answer: Yes. If you are in Immigration Court and have submitted several different types of applications, there is a new procedure being implemented which is another layer of security checks.

Question: Which applications are applicable?

Answer: The applications are divided into two areas. First, if you apply for Asylum and Withholding of Removal. Secondly would be if you are applying for Adjustment of Status, Cancellation of Removal for Lawful Permanent Residents, Cancellation of Removal for Non Permanent Residents, Suspension of Deportation or Special NACARA Suspension of Deportation.

Question: If you are applying for the first category of Asylum and Withholding of Removal, what must you now do?

Answer: You must send certain documents now to the USCIS Nebraska Service Center. It should be entitled ‘Defensive Asylum Application with Immigration Court.’ You need to send a clear copy of the first three pages of your completed Form I-589 (Application for Asylum and for Withholding of Removal) that you will be filing or have filed with the Immigration Court, which must include your full name, your current mailing address, and your alien number (A number). Do Not submit any documents other than the first three pages of the completed I-589) and (2) A copy of Form EOIR–28 (Notice of Entry of Appearance as Attorney or Representative before the Immigration Court) if you are represented by an attorney.

Question: What will happen after these documents are sent in?

Answer: A USCIS receipt notice in the mail indicating that USCIS has received your asylum application, and an Application Support Center (ASC) notice for you and each dependent included in your application. Each ASC noticewill indicate the individual’s unique receipt number and will provide instructions for each person to appear for an appointment at a nearby ASC for collection of biometrics (such as your photograph, fingerprints, and signature). You should receive the notice within three weeks after submitting the documents to the USCIS in Nebraska. You (and your dependents) must then attend the biometrics appointment at the ASC, and obtain a biometrics confirmation document before leaving the ASC, and retain your ASC biometrics confirmation as proof that your biometrics were taken, and bring it to your future Immigration Court hearings.

Question: What is the procedure for the other applications you stated will be filed in Immigration Court?

Answer: A clear copy of the entire application form that you will be filing or have filed with the Immigration Court. (Do not submit any documents other than the completed form itself); (2) the appropriate application fee; (3) the $70 USCIS biometrics fee and (4) A copy of Form EOIR–28 (Notice of Entry of Appearance as Attorney or Representative before the Immigration Court) if you are represented. You should send it to the USCIS Texas Service Center.

Question: After you send these documents to Texas, will the same procedure be followed as with the Asylum application.

Answer: Most of it is exactly the same. However, with these applications, after you receive your biometrics appointment and get your fingerprints taken, you must file the following with the Immigration Court within the time period directed by the Immigration Judge: (1) the original application Form, (2) all supporting documentation, and (3) the USCIS notice that instructs you to appear for an appointment at the ASC.

Hopefully, this new procedure will not delay proceedings and will move efficiently through the process.


 

Victory for Due Process Rights of Aliens

Question: I have heard that some new case just came down as a victory for a person filing for asylum. Is that true.

Answer: Yes. For years due process rights have been stripped away from aliens. These people who come into the United States are at the mercy of the laws of the United States. Many aliens apply for asylum in order to avoid having to return to their own countries which have persecuted them. They will leave everything behind and come to the United States with nothing else than the clothes on their backs. They are desperate people who are looking for refuge.

Once they come to the United States, they have one year to apply for asylum. First, the asylum will be processed and decided by the asylum officer. If that officer denies the case, it is immediately referred or sent to the Immigration Judge. In other words, when the alien loses at the asylum officer level, he or she is immediately put into deportation (now known as removal) proceedings.

The Immigration Judge will be able to hear the case de novo. Many times an alien will attempt the first try at asylum by themselves, and then, only after they lose at the asylum officer level will they secure counsel.

If the Immigration Judge denies the case, then it can be appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals. Lately, the Board of Immigration Appeals has been issuing summary decisions which are basically two to three lines long. These decisions many times will not give any type of reasoning as to why the decision was issued and why the alien’s case was denied.

However, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has just issued a decision which not only verifies certain due process rights still available for aliens, but criticizes the Board of Immigration Appeals on this particular decision.

In this case the Court had to decide whether the Board of Immigration Appeals erred in dismissing an appeal when the petitioner (the person applying for asylum) dutifully followed all regulations and procedures pertaining to filing his Notice of Appeal, but the Board of Immigration Appeals itself deprived him of the opportunity to timely file his brief by sending the briefing schedule and transcripts of proceedings to the wrong address.

The Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) contended that the Board of Immigration Appeals decision, dismissing petitioner’s appeal from the denial of asylum solely on adverse credibility grounds, should be affirmed despite the Board of Immigration Appeals failure to provide any notice and any opportunity to be heard. In other words, the Immigration Judge denied the asylum claim only and solely because he had found the alien not to be credible.

The Court ruled that because these minimal due process requirements are clear and fundamental, and petitioner was prejudiced by an adverse credibility determination unsupported by substantial evidence, that they would grant the petition. However, the path they took to grant the petition was full of statements to the Board of Immigration Appeals which indicate they were not pleased with the decision making process in this case.

In this case, the alien had timely filed an appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals. However, he had moved subsequent to filing the Notice of Appeal. Over one year later, the Board of Immigration Appeals had sent the briefing schedule to the alien’s old address. It stated when the opening brief needed to be filed. Once the alien had received notification of the briefing schedule the date for the filing of the brief had passed. He filed an unopposed motion to the Board of Immigration Appeals to be allowed to file a late brief based upon the fact he never received the briefing schedule. The Board of Immigration Appeals denied his request and ruled that his asylum will be denied because of the inconsistent testimony which they had refused to allow him to brief in order to explain why such inconsistencies might have occurred.

The Court stated that the alien provided a credible account of persecution on political and religious grounds. The alien, Singh fled his native India after suffering persecution due to his support of religious and political rights for the Sikh minority in the Punjab province of India. He entered the United States without inspection in November of 1995 and filed an application for asylum. On September 26, 1996, the Immigration and Naturalization Service commenced deportation proceedings against him.

In his asylum application, and during seven subsequent hearings before an Immigration Judge held over the course of more than four years, Singh described his activism on behalf of the Sikh separatist movement in Punjab, including his membership in the All India Sikh Student Federation (“AISSF”) and his support of the Akali Dal Party.

At the age of nineteen, Singh became involved with the AISSF after an attack on the Sikh Golden Temple, which was believed to be the work of Indian security forces. In 1988, Singh was arrested during an AISSF rally that he organized in Jallhandar. He was held in jail for fifteen days, while being beaten and tortured by the police. He was never charged with a crime nor brought before a judge.

In January of 1992, Indian police again arrested Singh without a warrant. He was held for twenty days, beaten with a bamboo stick, punched, kicked, and threatened with death if he did not end his affiliation with the AISSF. The police told him he was arrested because of his association with Sikh militants, even though he adamantly denied any such association.

In August 1993, Singh was arrested for a third time, along with three other AISSF members, while leaving the Sikh temple in his village. He was held by the police for thirteen days, during which time he was beaten until he lost consciousness. His head was shaved, an affront to Sikh religious practice, and he was then forced to stand for hours under the hot summer sun.

In April 1995, Singh testified that he was arrested for a fourth and final time while distributing party posters and collecting party funds. This time, he was held in jail for thirty-five days, again without being charged with a crime or taken before a judge. While in jail, he was tortured, humiliated, and threatened with death if he continued to support the AISSF.

The Board of Immigration Appeals ruled that they found three inconsistencies (even though they did not let the alien explain those inconsistencies.) The Court held that adverse credibility findings are reviewed for substantial evidence. The Court went on to rule that the Board of Immigration Appeals refusal to allow Singh to file a brief explaining his allegedly inconsistent testimony violated his right to due process. They ruled that the Board of Immigration Appeals must provide a petitioner with a reasonable opportunity to offer an explanation of any perceived inconsistencies that form the basis of a denial of asylum. Denying Singh the opportunity to file a brief plainly violates this well-established due process right.

In statements which the Board was reprimanded, the Court stated that the Board, after sending the briefing schedule and transcript to an incorrect address, justified denying Singh’s motion to file a late brief by asserting that the motion was untimely. However, to comport with due process requirements, the notice afforded aliens about deportation proceedings must be reasonably calculated to reach them. The Court stated that notice mailed to an address different from the one Singh provided could not have conceivably been reasonably calculated to reach him. As Singh was not afforded notice of the deadline, the Board of Immigration Appeals reasoning that his motion was untimely is patently insufficient.

Singh’s testimony took place over the course of seven hearings spread out over four years, during some of which he was so fatigued that the hearing had to be continued “in deference to the respondent’s condition.” After reviewing Singh’s testimony alongside his explanatory brief, the Court concluded that the testimony was remarkably consistent given the circumstances. The Board of Immigration Appeals decision to the contrary was not supported by substantial evidence, and could only be a result of its refusal to entertain Singh’s brief. The Court went on further to state that the Board of Immigration Appeals own words were revealing: it considered its conclusion bolstered by he fact that Singh failed to provide “any specific and detailed arguments about the contents of his testimony and why he should be deemed a credible witness.” Because the Board of Immigration Appeals denied him the opportunity to do just that, they reversed its determination that Singh is not credible.

In its final ruling, the Court held that because the adverse credibility decision was the sole basis for the denial of asylum, substantial evidence compelled them to find that Singh is eligible for asylum. They remanded the case back to the Board of Immigration Appeals to exercise its discretion, accepting Singh’s testimony as credible, to determine whether to grant asylum.

This case is a victory for aliens insofar as it shows that their due process rights cannot simply be trampled upon and that they must be afforded some level of due process in their asylum claims.