CBP announced that it is setting up a temporary holding facility adjacent to the Donna-Rio Bravo International Bridge in Donna, Texas, to provide additional capacity for unaccompanied children and family units in CBP custody at Ports of Entry and U.S. Border Patrol stations in the South Texas area. The temporary site can currently hold up to 500 people, but CBP stated that it will regularly assess whether to expand this facility or keep it operational based on the number of people arriving in the area.
Where the Cuban respondent was paroled into the United States on August 25, 1980, as part of the Mariel Boatlift with an Arrival/Departure Record (Form I-94) stamped “Cuban/Haitian Entrant (Status Pending)” indicating that the purpose of his parole was for “Cuban Asylum,” the BIA held in a precedent decision issued today that the respondent was ineligible to adjust his status under INA §209, because he did not establish that he was either admitted as a “refugee” within the meaning of INA §207 or granted asylum under INA §208.
Matter of SILVA-TREVINO, 26 I&N Dec. 826 (BIA 2016)
(1) The categorical and modified categorical approaches provide the proper framework for determining whether a conviction is for a crime involving moral turpitude.
(2) Unless the controlling case law of the governing Federal court of appeals expressly dictates otherwise, the realistic probability test, which focuses on the minimum conduct that has a realistic probability of being prosecuted under the statute of conviction, should be applied in determining whether an offense is a categorical crime involving moral turpitude.
(3) Under the “minimum reading” approach applied by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the respondent’s conviction for indecency with a child under section 21.11(a)(1) of the Texas Penal Code is not for a categorical crime involving moral turpitude.
(4) An alien who has engaged in misconduct involving sexual abuse of a minor is not required to make a heightened evidentiary showing of hardship or other factors to establish that an application for relief warrants a favorable exercise of discretion.
The respondent’s removability as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony was not established where section 76‑10‑508.1 of the Utah Code was not shown to be divisible with respect to the mens rea necessary for the offense to qualify as a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a)(2012), based on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016), and Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013). Matter of Chairez, 26 I&N Dec. 349 (BIA 2014), and Matter of Chairez, 26 I&N Dec. 478 (BIA 2015), clarified.
Matter of ZARAGOZA-VAQUERO, 26 I&N Dec. 814 (BIA 2016)
The offense of criminal copyright infringement in violation of 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1)(A) (2012) and 18 U.S.C. § 2319(b)(1) (2012) is a crime involving moral turpitude.
Matter of IBARRA, 26 I&N Dec. 809 (BIA 2016) ID 3872
(1) A “theft offense” under section 101(a)(43)(G) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 101(a)(43)(G) (2012), which requires the taking of property “without consent,” includes extortionate takings, in which consent is coerced by the wrongful use of force, fear, or threats.
(2) Robbery by force or fear in violation of section 211 of the California Penal Code is categorically an aggravated felony theft offense under section 101(a)(43)(G) of the Act.